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Abstract 
If behavior analysis is to contribute to the amelioration of those aspects of 
environmental despoliation that are the result of consumption, it is necessary to show 
systematically that the consumer behaviors in question are contingent on their 
consequences and that environmental management strategies can be systematically 
addressed to their modification. Consumer behavior analysis (Foxall, 2001, 2002) 
provides an operant understanding of consumption as the result of the scope of the 
consumer behavior setting and the pattern of reinforcement that maintains it. The 
theory of the marketing firm (Foxall, 1999a) shows how organizations respond to 
consumer behavior by managing consumer behavior setting scope and pattern of 
reinforcement. Environment-impacting consumption and corporate attempts to 
reverse its impact can therefore be understood in operant terms. The question remains 
how we can understand the relationship between a complex contextual system like a 
firm, the behavior of which is predictable and controllable by considering its 
emergent operant consequences and the collective behaviors of consumers, each of 
whom is a contextual system responding uniquely to the peculiar pattern of 
contingencies that shapes and maintains its behavior. The paper seeks the solution in 
terms of bilateral contingencies and to relate these to issues arising from the theory of 
metacontingency and macro-behavior.       
 
 
Keywords: consumer behavior analysis, marketing firm, bilateral contingency, 
metacontingency, environmental despoliation 
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Consumer Behavior Analysis and the Marketing Firm: 
Bilateral Contingency in the Context of Environmental Concern 
Levels 
We cannot do research that addresses complex human behavior, complex 
human problems, with the same conceptual apparatus and investigative methods that 
are so well-suited to experimental research into animal behavior. Methodological 
progression is inevitable as the principle of selection by consequences is progressively 
applied to the investigation of natural selection, operant conditioning, and cultural 
evolution (Skinner, 1981). This does not mean that we have to abandon the basic 
tenets of behavior analysis but it does require that we acknowledge the differences of 
degree and of kind between behavior that can be examined in the closed setting of the 
operant laboratory and that encountered in the world at large. There is a clear 
progression from the experimental space, the realm of individual behavior, through 
the organization, to society in general. Increasing methodological complexity is 
inevitable as we move from contingencies to metacontingencies to cultural 
contingencies.    
 It is this third area, defined in terms of cultural contingency, with which we 
are concerned when we seek to effect broad societal change. But seeking to act 
directly on cultural contingencies may not be the surest way to succeed. To use an 
idea that is commonplace among chemical engineers, we need to “scale up” from the 
situations that are more directly under our control to those that we wish to influence, 
even though they are not. Scaling up requires intermediate models that elaborate 
without replacing the three-term contingency, but which render it more appropriate 
for the analysis of behavior beyond the confines of the operant chamber. Such models 
must be empirically testable if they are to provide a basis for interpretation. Hence, 
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the fact that we are involved in the process of behavioral interpretation does not give 
us license to arbitrarily label events we observe as discriminative stimuli, responses 
and reinforcing stimuli. Our interpretations rely for their validity and reliability on a 
model of environment-behavior relationships that can be empirically demonstrated, 
preferably with the full rigor of an experimental analysis. Two such models are 
employed in this paper: the Behavioral Perspective Model of consumer choice (BPM) 
and that of The Marketing Firm (TMF).   
Consumer Behavior Analysis and the Marketing Firm 
First, the paper explores consumer choice as the outcome of operant 
contingencies (Foxall, 1990/2004), which has been supported by a wide range of 
empirical research, experimental and non-experimental, in behavioral economics and 
marketing science. Second, it addresses the behavior of the organizations that respond 
to consumer choice: marketing firms. The concept of the marketing firm (Foxall, 
1999a) proposes that the raison d’être of the business organization is marketing, i.e., 
creating and keeping a buyer by responding appropriately to buyer behavior. A key 
tenet is that the behavior of the marketing firm can be predicted from and explained 
by its supra-personal consequences, predominantly the effectiveness of the marketing 
mixes – product, price, promotion and place utilities – it supplies to the market.2 In 
other words, the firm is a “contextual system” or “operant system”, one predictable 
from its learning history and the behavioral outcomes made possible by its current 
situation (Foxall, 1999b). This feature of organizational behavior analysis finds 
resonance in work on metacontingencies (e.g., Glenn, 2004). 
                                                        
2 While the marketing department or function is responsible for the technical devising and 
implementation of marketing mixes, these can be optimally directed toward the profitable fulfillment of 
customer requirements only in the context of a customer-oriented perspective which the marketing firm 
supplies. Therefore, this paper refers to the provision of marketing mixes as a corporate-level 
responsibility of the marketing firm as a whole.   
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 The essence of metacontingency theory is that the behavior of an organization 
is greater than or different from that of the combined repertoires of its members. The 
behavioral components of the system are enmeshed in interlocking behavioral 
contingencies (IBCs). The supra-individual behavior of the system is inferred from 
the outputs it produces. Hence, each element of the marketing mix – the product, the 
price, the promotional communications and the distribution system – can be used to 
infer behaviors or behavior programs that denote the salient actions of the 
organizational system. Biglan & Glenn (2013) state that “the term metacontingencies 
can describe the contingent relations between IBC lineages with their products, on the 
one hand, and the consequent actions of their external environment on the other.” 
Metacontingency theory and the concept of the marketing firm have much in common 
if two emphases of the latter, with which this paper is centrally concerned, are 
appreciated. First, what metacontingency theory refers to as the “product” of the 
supra-personal behavior of organizations is actually in the context of the marketing 
firm the “product, price, promotion and place” that make up the marketing mix. 
Second, the concept of the marketing firm places a strong emphasis on the exchange 
relationships that bind the marketing firm and its consumerate together, which it 
analyzes in terms of bilateral contingencies.        
 The starting point is that both individuals and organizations such as the 
marketing firm can be considered as “contextual systems” (Foxall, 1999b); i.e., their 
behavior can be predicted from their learning history3 and current behavior setting. 
                                                        
3 The question of how an organization can be said to have a learning history 
requires an answer that goes beyond the limits of this paper. An organizational 
learning history might simply be that of its leader or leaders; it might be that of a 
dominant coalition within the firm or consist in the tacit and explicit knowledge 
base within the enterprise, the procedures to which its members’ behavior 
patterns conform; or the set of verbal behaviors and rules that govern its 
activities. For considerations that arise within behavior analysis, see Houmanfar, 
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The marketing firm is an evolved environment that comprises a system of 
interlocking internal behavioral contingencies. It is also, by definition, an organization 
that is linked by a nexus of contingencies with an external public. The 
interdependence of the marketing firm and its customer base that is the subject of this 
paper has been analyzed through the concept of bilateral contingencies (Foxall, 
1999a; Vella & Foxall, 2011, 2013). The paper explores the nature of bilateral 
contingencies that link a complex organization that is a contextual system in its own 
right with a public that consists of a myriad of individual contextual systems. Rather 
than do so in abstract terms, however, it concentrates on attempts to engender 
prosocial consumption to mitigate environmental damage. The aim of the discussion 
is not to provide novel solutions to this problem, though the analysis may clarify some 
of the issues involved; it is to elucidate the nature of the contingencies that account 
for the behavior of each of these types of contextual system not in isolation but as 
they form the exchange transactions that characterize market economies.  
 In turn, the marketing firm model benefits from the distinction Biglan and 
Glenn (2013) make between the behavioral outputs of organizations that are 
metacontingencies and those of collectivities of persons who form the firm’s 
consumerate. (For discussion of the notion of consumers as collectivities, see 
Houmanfar, Rodrigues, and Smith, 2009). The firm’s being a metacontingency 
means, then, that its behavioral output emerges from the behaviors of its members and 
is different from and greater than its members’ combined behaviors. This behavior 
evolves in its own right as its consequences are selected or deselected by the 
environment, in this case by the firm’s customers and potential customers. The 
                                                                                                                                                              
Rodrigues, and Smith (2009). The conceptualization at which this passage hints, 
however, is broader than these, consisting in an abstraction of learning 
processes that influence the entire conduct of the firm within its market place.  
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behavior of those consumers is of a different order, however. The behavioral output of 
the mass of consumers is simply the aggregated behavioral output of them all. We 
may perform statistical operations on measures of this behavior – aggregate it, 
average it, relate it to other measures – but however we treat it, it does not amount to 
anything but individual operant behavior. It is simply, “the operant behavior of many 
people that has a cumulative and measurable effect on the environment” (Biglan & 
Glenn, 2013). Crucially, it does not evolve as an entity in itself. It does not produce 
behavioral outputs over and above those of consumers en masse which can be 
differentially acted upon by a selective environment. Such behavior, albeit the 
behavioral output of a large collectivity, is simply macro-behavior (Glenn, 2004).    
Environment-Impacting Consumption   
Environment-impacting consumption is notorious for its broader physical and 
social consequences: such as fossil fuel depletion, air pollution an health disbenefits 
that result from excessive reliance on transportation systems, esthetic, health and 
economic demerits of indiscriminate waste disposal, depletion of fossil fuels and 
contribution to global warming in the case of over-consumption of domestic energy, 
and depletion of natural resources in the case of excessive water consumption (van 
Vliet, Chappells & Shove, 2005). These broader societal outcomes define the cultural 
contingencies that Skinner (1981) and others have drawn attention to. They involve a 
“tragedy of the commons,” in Hardin’s (1968) words: exemplified by the fact that 
farmers who share rights to common land feel no added burden if one of their number 
increases their flock by a single sheep but that all suffer severe disadvantages when 
every farmer does so (Foxall, 1979). It is in these circumstances that some 
management theorists and behavior analysts have advocated “social marketing” to 
address these concerns (Foxall et al., 2006). However, it is legitimate to question 
 8 
whether the direct assault on cultural contingencies is the most effective strategy for 
change, to advocate a more intermediate level of analysis, and to examine the 
practical and theoretical implications of this approach.        
Plan of the Paper 
§2 shows how consumer behavior is contingent on patterns of reinforcement 
that derive from the functional and symbolic benefits of products and services. A 
behavior analytical model of consumer choice, the Behavioral Perspective Model 
(BPM), predicts economic dimensions of consumption such as product and brand 
choice, the sensitivity of demand to price, and the kinds of utility that consumers 
maximize; it also predicts consumers’ emotional reactions to retail and consumption 
situations. This model is employed in §3 to interpret environment-impacting 
consumption in the spheres of private versus public transportation, waste disposal, the 
over-exploitation of domestic energy, and the domestic consumption of water, all 
themes that have been well-researched by applied behavior analysts. §4 illustrates the 
ways in which marketing firms respond to consumer demands by showing how a 
parallel behavior analytic model, this time the concept of The Marketing Firm (TMF), 
describes how marketing-oriented management can be interpreted in behavior 
analytical terms. §5 outlines how marketing firms have responded to problems of 
environmental despoliation. This makes possible an exploration of the bilateral 
contingencies joining marketing firms and their customer bases, which in turn permits 
an extension of metacontingency theory in the realm of cultural contingencies (§6).       
Consumer Behavior Analysis 
Consumer behavior analysis is the application of behavioral psychology and 
behavioral economics to understanding the market place of human purchase and 
consumption behaviors (Foxall, 2001, 2002a).  
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The Behavioral Perspective Model  
The Behavioral Perspective Model (Figure 1) is an elaboration of the three-
term contingency to sensitize it to the analysis of human consumption in the market 
place (Foxall 1990/2004). The setting in which consumer choice takes place is 
consists not of a single stimulus but an array of discriminative stimuli and motivating 
operations that set the scene for consumption. The topography of consumer behavior 
settings is diverse, from stores and restaurants through ATMs and online banking to 
cultural events and lectures. Consumer behavior settings vary too in the extent to 
which they encourage or inhibit specific responses. A bar or a bookstore offers 
multiple choices among which to make our selection and we are not even constrained 
to remain in the setting. Consumer behavior settings like these which offer multiple 
responses are relatively open settings. Banks and cinemas, by contrast, allow rather 
more restricted behavior or pattern of behavior; gyms and emergency rooms, even 
moreso. Settings like these that offer one or at most a few behavioral options are 
relatively closed.    
 We have, therefore, a continuum of consumer behavior settings from the most 
open to the most closed which we can analyze in terms of discriminative stimuli and 
motivating operations as well as their scope: their openness/closedness and its 
implications for consumer choice. The scope of the setting is influenced by the way in 
which the consumer’s learning history impinges on the stimulus setting to influence 
the probability of certain behaviors taking place and others remaining dormant. The 
learning history brings meaning to the behavior setting. The intersection of the 
consumer’s learning history (or experience) with the behavior setting that define the 
consumer situation which is the immediate precursor of consumer behavior. 
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 Human social and economic behavior is shaped and maintained by two 
sources of reinforcement. Almost any watch will provide us with the time. That is the 
utility we expect from a timepiece. However, for many people, a Rolex watch offers 
so much more: social status, self-esteem, honor, prestige. Utilitarian reinforcement, 
which we share with other organisms, is the receipt of functional benefits that confer 
material satisfactions, the utility of orthodox microeconomic theory, contributors to 
biological fitness in evolutionary theory. Informational reinforcement is performance 
feedback, an indication of how well the consumer is doing. As well as being 
positively reinforced by the consumer’s acceptance of utilitarian and informational 
reinforcers or the avoidance of/escape from aversive consequences, consumer 
behavior is also punished by aversive consequences.  For example, a luxury cruise is 
positively reinforced by the utility it supplies (the results of sunshine, rest, good food, 
etc.) and informationally (by the status it confers).  Using a stain remover is 
negatively reinforced by the erasure of the mark on the carpet to which it is applied.  
Both consumer behaviors meet with aversive consequences, however:  the surrender 
of hard earned money in the first case, the energy that has to be expended in the 
second. We can define consumer behavior in operant terms by reference to the 
relatively high or relatively low levels of utilitarian and informational reinforcement 
that maintain it (Figure 2). In summary, consumer behavior is shaped and maintained 
by (i) the scope of the consumer behavior setting and (ii) the pattern of reinforcement 
provided by available products and services. 
Environment-impacting Consumption 
Environment-impacting consumption can be analyzed in terms of the BPM. 
That is, we can understand environment-impacting consumption in terms of the scope 
of the consumer behavior setting and the pattern of reinforcement that maintains the 
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behavior. We have a unique set of research findings that provide an independent 
analysis of these contingencies as they relate to (i) private transportation, (ii) waste 
disposal (specifically, littering), (iii) domestic energy consumption, and (iv) domestic 
water consumption. The applied behavior analysts who conducted this research, 
particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, employed different terminology from that of the 
BPM but the sources of reinforcement are similar: incentives correspond to what we 
would call utilitarian reinforcement, feedback to informational reinforcement, and 
prompts perhaps to discriminative stimuli and rules. Moreover, the applied behavior 
analysis research has had the goal of changing the behaviors it has investigated by the 
manipulation of the contingencies: as a result we have a dynamic demonstration of the 
contextual factors that actually modify these behaviors.4 
Discouragement of Private Transportation  
 The goal here has been to modify consumers' private transportation behavior in 
order to reduce fuel consumption, urban congestion, and pollution by discouraging 
unilateral use of private cars and promoting public or shared transportation. The 
evidence is that only high levels of incentives and feedback have had an appreciable 
effect on the number of miles travelled in private cars or the amount spent on fossil 
fuels.  
 While the discouragement of car travel can reduce mileage travelled by as much 
as half, the provision of feedback plays a strong role in reducing driving if it is combined 
with appropriate incentives. Each of these rewards relies on the provision of the other in 
order to be effective and it is the interaction of financial savings and feedback on 
changed performance that, as a combined source of reinforcement, influences driving 
                                                        
4 Relevant reviews ot the applied behavior analysis literature on environmental conservation 
include Foxall,(1994, 2002b, 2002c, 2013) and Foxall et al. (2006). There are also excellent 
comprehensive reviews by Cone and Hayes (1980) and Geller et al. (1984). The present 
exposition,summarizes the results of these reviews.     
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behavior. Hence, feedback alone (on the number of miles travelled, operating costs, 
depreciation, social costs, etc.) exerts little if any effect on mileage travelled, 
performance feedback influences behavior by encouraging the driver to monitor 
behavior in order to achieve the incentives contingent on behavior modification.  
 In summary, both utilitarian reinforcement and informational reinforcement at 
high levels are required to change behavior and the appropriate operant class of 
consumer behavior is therefore accomplishment. This is borne out by consideration of 
the benefits of private transportation. Private transportation supplies high levels of 
both utilitarian and informational reinforcement: utilitarian reinforcement in the form 
of control, comfort, flexibility, reliability, privacy, speed, fun, safety, protection; 
informational reinforcement in the form of travel time reduction, cargo capacity, 
predictability, and above all autonomy and social status including self-esteem; it has 
important aversive consequences too: putting up with traffic congestion, stress, costs 
of purchase and maintenance, adverse comment. Moreover, a measure of the strength 
of this pattern of reinforcement on consumer behavior is apparent from the level of 
aversive consequences that the individual is willing to incur in order to continue with 
this product choice. In the case of private transportation, these are high. 
Waste Disposal 
 The goal here has been to reduce littering in public places by encouraging use of 
waste bins; to stimulate the recycling of irreplaceable materials; to enlist consumers in a 
process of waste recovery. Attempts at reducing littering have relied heavily on the use 
of prompts. The results have been generally disappointing except where the target 
behaviors were facilitated by provision of bins and rewarded by incentives. In the field 
experiments conducted by applied behavior analysts, even the provision of a dime or a 
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ticket for a movie had a considerable effect on recycling behavior.  Exhortations, 
lectures, and relevant general education have proved largely ineffective. 
 In summary, the relevant operant class is hedonism: utilitarian reinforcement is 
high, while informational reinforcement is relatively low. This is borne out by 
considering the utilitarian reinforcement of littering, predominantly ease of disposal, and 
the informational reinforcement which consists perhaps in conspicuous consumption, 
social prestige, social status. The aversive consequences are also apparent: social 
disapproval (if noticed by others). The consumer behavior in question (littering, 
indiscriminate waste disposal) is maintained by immediately-acting contingencies that 
are countered by the availability of alternative methods of disposal such as rubbish bins. 
The adverse consequences apparently have little effect on a consumer who is adding 
litter or other waste to an already-infested site. The tragedy of the commons is only too 
apparent. 
Domestic Energy Consumption 
 The objective in this case has been to reduce over-consumption of domestic 
energy derived from fossil fuels, notably electricity for heating and lighting through the 
provision of prompts pointing out the long term consequences, feedback on individuals' 
and households' recent consumption levels, and financial and other incentives for 
reduced usage. 
 Attempted modification of consumers' domestic energy consumption has 
incorporated antecedent prompting, feedback, and incentives, separately and in 
combination. Prompting alone (e.g., information about environmental effects of 
pollution caused by over-consumption of electricity at peak periods had little if any 
effect on peak usage. The greatest behavior change was effected by consumer self-
monitoring of current energy use. Energy usage proved especially sensitive to feedback, 
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especially if this was frequent: daily feedback on energy usage, especially when 
combined with group feedback and mild social commendation for prosocial behavior, is 
particularly effective, the combination of prompts and feedback with incentives even 
moreso. This is an area of consumption where a high level of utilitarian reinforcement in 
the form of instant power, heating and lighting is taken for granted; there is no 
opportunity for trade-offs here between lower prices and less efficient provision.  
 In summary, the operant class is accumulation: utilitarian reinforcement is 
essential but behavior change is particularly sensitive to informational reinforcement.  
Utilitarian reinforcement takes the form of warmth, use of electrical and electronic 
appliances, comfort, convenience; informational reinforcement, of status, self-esteem 
(these derive from direct availability of energy and, indirectly, from ability to acquire 
and operate gadgets, appliances. The principal aversive consequence is the financial 
outlay necessary.  
Domestic Water Consumption 
 The objective has been to reduce domestic consumption of water, especially in 
washing, cleaning and gardening. There is less directly generated ABA experimental 
evidence for the behavioral economics of water consumption and conservation than for 
the other commodities and products considered but the limited evidence confirms the 
pattern of results found for other commodities. In Perth, Australia, that water 
consumption decreased by over 30% in both an experimental group provided with daily 
feedback on water use and a rebate proportionate to demand reduction, and a control 
group provided only with feedback, though change in climatic conditions may also have 
affected the results. The low elasticity of demand for water makes financial rebates less 
appropriate than for other classes of consumer behavior. 
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 In summary, the operant class is maintenance: there are relatively low levels of 
utilitarian reinforcement and informational reinforcement. Utilitarian reinforcement 
stems from water use, cleanliness, hygiene; prevention of disease, while informational 
reinforcement is apparent in status and social approval. The aversive consequences are 
also considerable and include local taxes, charges, rationing, pricing, and metering. 
 
 
Summing-Up 
The main conclusions of this discussion are summarized in Figure 3. The 
question that arises now is how society responds to consumer behavior and in 
particular what form of response to environment-impacting consumption has been 
forthcoming. The marketing firm is the means of organizational response to consumer 
behavior and that the response to environment-impacting consumption has been 
uncannily sympathetic to the findings of applied behavior analysis.  
The Marketing Firm 
The Marketing Firm in Context 
The organization that responds to consumer choice is the marketing firm. The 
idea of the marketing firm, which reflects aspects of the thought of Coase (1937), 
Drucker (2007) and Simon (1976, 1987), posits that the primary rationale for firms, 
given the structural nature of modern markets is to undertake customer-oriented 
management.  That is, to respond to the general economic and social conditions that 
make production orientation unprofitable and which compel a customer-oriented 
strategy not only on the part of the marketing department or function but of the entire 
enterprise. The marketing firm is not, therefore, simply a firm that undertakes 
marketing activities; nor yet does the term refer to the marketing department or 
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function of the enterprise. It is the entire firm as it responds to the opportunities to 
satisfy consumer wants and the competitive threats enjoined upon it by the structural 
economic and social conditions that compel marketing-oriented management. (For 
elaboration, see Foxall, 1999b; Vella & Foxall, 2011). The conditions that compel 
customer-orientation are (i) supply or potential supply exceeding aggregate demand, 
(ii) high levels of discretionary income, (iii) intense inter-industrial competition 
among suppliers, and (iv) consumer sophistication (Foxall, 1981). These 
circumstances necessitate marketing planning and research, product development, 
market segmentation strategies (rather than the attempt to satisfy the entire market), 
and assiduity in planning and producing, implementing and managing, integrated 
marketing mixes that meet corporate goals (e.g., Kotler et al., 2012). All of these are 
matters are so closely intertwined with the raison-d’etre of the firm – why it exists, 
what it does – that the relationship of marketing and corporate strategies is more than 
alignment: it is coincidence. Both strategic perspectives involve answers to the 
questions famously raised by Drucker (2007): what business are we in? who is our 
customer? who will be the customer? The shelter of the corporate environment is 
required to ensure that these tasks are undertaken without their being observed by 
competitors. Whatever the historical basis for the existence of firms (e.g., Coase, 
1937; Nooteboom, 2009; Sautet, 2000), this philosophy of management provides their 
contemporary rationale.  
Only Marketing?  
It is natural to ask why the marketing firm has been given a single function 
when surely firms produce, consult, and practice as well as market. The marketing 
firm concept is an extension of Coase’s (1937) realization that firms exist because 
they minimize transaction costs, an insight that has become central to the definition of 
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economic institutions and the delineation of their unique nature. Transactions will be 
incorporated within the firm when the costs of coordination they entail become 
thereby smaller than if they were undertaken through individual contracting among 
independent producers. Coase’s recognition of the implications of costs of transacting 
in the market place transforms understanding of the nature of business behaviour and 
of the business enterprise itself. It is possible, however, to extend his analysis to 
incorporate characteristics of the modern corporation that do not figure, at least not 
prominently, in his work. In particular, in Coase’s purview, the firm is essentially a 
unit of production and, while he employs the term “marketing costs” (rather than 
“transaction costs”), his analysis says little of the firm as a marketing entity. This is 
conveyed by both the title and the tenor of his 1991 Nobel Lecture (Coase, 1993): 
even allowing for the inclusion of marketing activity within the term “production,” 
this usage fails to discriminate the various kinds and functions of marketing costs 
understood as those of coordinating marketing intelligence and the profitable 
provision of consumer benefits. If we extend Coase’s insight to include the marketing 
operations of firms, however, this leads to the bolder claims that, since the pursuit of 
marketing-oriented management is the prime motive for their current rationale, all 
firms are necessarily marketing firms; in short, marketing provides the raison d’être of 
the contemporary corporation. Another way of putting this is that Coasean analysis 
concentrates on the inputs to the firm's productive processes; the concept of the 
marketing firm extends the analysis by, first, incorporating the subset of these inputs 
that are ultimately involved in output decisions, and second, by considering the 
outputs themselves as entities that need to be coordinated as much as the inputs.  
Bilateral Contingency   
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In general terms, firms attempt to manage their relationships with their 
customers. The marketing firm can be defined as an organization that responds to 
consumer behavior by producing marketing mixes that influence consumer choice by 
managing the pattern of reinforcement of the consumer and the scope of the consumer 
behavior setting. This entails the formation and management of marketing 
relationships, which are characterized by literal exchange, exchange of legal title to a 
product or service on one hand and whatever it is exchanged for (usually money) on 
the other (Foxall, 1999a). This general observation translates well into an account of 
into the activities of the marketing firm viewed in behavior analytic terms? We have 
shown that consumer behavior is a function of the scope of the consumer behavior 
setting and the pattern of reinforcement that shapes and maintains choice. The 
behavior of the marketing firm may be represented as a response to consumer demand 
that involves managing the scope of the consumer behavior setting so that the brand 
marketed by the firm becomes a more salient member of the consumer’s 
consideration set, and managing the pattern of reinforcement by providing appropriate 
responses to the operant classes of accomplishment, hedonism, accumulation and 
maintenance shown by consumers (Vella & Foxall, 2011, 2013).  
 The means by which marketing firms respond to consumer behavior is by 
attempting to effectively manage the bilateral contingencies that link them with their 
customer bases (Figure 4). Firms undertake this by researching consumer behavior 
and wants, and designing and implementing marketing mixes that use product, price, 
promotion and place as effectively as possible in order to achieve corporate objectives 
by profitably meeting consumer requirements. Consumers respond by buying or 
rejecting the offerings of firms and thereby fulfilling or thwarting the financial 
objectives of the enterprise. The behavior of marketers thus provides as its outputs the 
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discriminative stimuli and motivating operations that embody the behavior setting of 
the consumer and the satisfactions (we would say, reinforcers) that shape and 
maintain consumer choice; in turn, the behaviors of consumers provide as their 
outputs the revenues and profits that influence corporate planning and operations. 
 The essence of bilateral contingency is that the parties are sufficiently closely 
connected to read clearly the behaviors of one another and for these, and their 
outcomes, to act as discriminative stimuli and reinforcers/punishers for further 
behavior (Foxall, 1999a, 2014b). While these relationships depend heavily on rule-
governed behavior as well as that which is directly contingency-shaped, the bilateral 
contingencies involved allow the behavior of one party to be responsive with some 
immediacy to that of the other, to be in touch with the other party by virtue of 
proximal rather than distal, concrete rather than highly symbolic, reinforcements 
(Foxall, 2013).       
 
Reponses to Environment-Impacting Consumption 
The actual attempts to redress problems of environment-impacting 
consumption have followed the prescriptions of both ABA and the suggestions of the 
marketing firm. (European examples have been chosen because they facilitate the 
comparison of nations and cultures for which similarly-based measures apply. But 
these are supplemented by studies for the United States and Australia.)   
Private Transportation  
It is predicted on the basis of the preceding analyses in terms of ABA research 
and the market firm that the crucial marketing mix element will be the product; the 
pattern of reinforcement that must be maintained or enhanced is high utilitarian 
reinforcement and high informational reinforcement: accomplishment. The actual 
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marketing response: provision of benefits previously in the province of private 
transportation: comfort, speed, and reliability combined with enhancement of status. It 
is likely, however, that charges for the new services, whether recovered by pricing or 
taxation have risen.  
 Changes in mode and frequency of transportation can be implemented by fiat, 
e.g., by banning cars with particular index numbers from the streets on certain days. 
The approach known as “voluntary travel-behavior change” (VTBC), as employed in 
Australia, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and the USA, are 
claimed effective even though they do not rely on compulsion (Friman et al., 2012). 
Drawing on recent research by Friman et al. (2012, 2013), Redman et al. (2012), 
Richter et al. (2010, 2012), I would like to summarize the results of these so-called 
“soft” transport policies (in contrast to “hard” policies (which entail the use of 
punitive pricing, legislation and investment in infrastructure) in order to show how 
they approach the consumer. I want also to distinguish market-based measures as 
opposed to coercion and to draw attention to the fact that general cultural 
contingencies will favor one or the other depending on the society involved. Market-
based measures include road and congestion charging, kilometer/mileage charges, 
fuel duty and parking charges, and public transport discounts and travel vouchers. 
Coercion includes taxation, road closure, punitive pricing, and so on. Most societies – 
perhaps all societies – combine market-based and coercive measures.           
 Another approach is Voluntary travel behavior change (VTBC) which 
encourages drivers “to make a voluntary switch towards a more sustainable travel 
mode”. There may be no such thing as voluntary behavior but we can easily 
understand these measures as offering drivers alternative behavior patterns that are 
positively reinforced, thereby expanding the scope of their consumer behavior 
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settings. VTBC can be combined with either market-based or coercive policies or all 
three can be incorporated in a comprehensive policy. There is indeed evidence of 
synergy between the hard and soft measures such a policy requires. Studies in the US 
and the Netherlands show that VTBC alone resulted in reductions of 5-15% in car 
travel, while reductions in car use by 20-25% were apparent when VTBC was used in 
combination with hard measures such as parking management and bus subsidy.      
 All of these types of measure involve either a corporate metacontingency or a 
government metacontingency or a combination of the two transacting with individual 
consumers. The behavior of road-users reflects patterns of reinforcement imposed by 
others. It remains that of individual drivers. If we aggregate it, it remains macro-
behavior that does not evolve in its right. The actions of the metacontingencies in this 
case, however, are instrumental in extending rather than restricting the scope of the 
consumer behavior setting.       
Waste Disposal  
Applied behavior analysis and the marketing firm lead to the prediction that 
the crucial predicted marketing mix element is place; the pattern of reinforcement that 
must be maintained or enhanced is high utilitarian reinforcement and low 
informational reinforcement: hedonism. The actual marketing response has been more 
concentrated provision of bins which seeks to change behavior by enhanced utilitarian 
reinforcement. In addition, the agencies responsible have emphasized that greener 
areas promote pride.   
 It is unlikely that the effects of littering or more destructive forms of 
indiscriminate waste disposal can be assuaged by the market alone. Most anti-litter 
interventions are the result of action by local government or facility owners/managers 
but in either case they are enforced ultimately by systems of fining malfeasants which 
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require central government involvement. The emphasis on punishment (fines) may 
well encourage visitors to dispose of litter more carefully though still illegally. A 
study by Keep America Beautiful revealed that only two variables are significantly 
related to littering: availability of receptacles and amount of litter present.  (KAB, 
2009, 22). It has also proved possible to segment litterers. (Lyndhurst, 2012).  
And so, the behavior of individual consumers/disconsumers is aggregated into macro-
behavior albeit at the level of the segment. Such behavior does not evolve.    
Domestic Energy  
The predictions of ABA and the marketing firm are that the crucial marketing 
mix element is promotion, while the pattern of reinforcement that must be maintained 
or enhanced is low utilitarian reinforcement and high informational reinforcement: 
accumulation. The actual marketing response has been smart metering giving (near-) 
instant feedback on consumption, allowing costs paid to be controlled by the 
consumer without reducing the overall utilitarian benefits obtained. The crucial factor 
is informational reinforcement. In addition, util reinforcement has been maintained by  
lagging, double glazing, insulation, building regulations. 
 In energy there is a concerted consumer-oriented program which has 
incorporated sound research and the encouragement of metering of domestic energy 
supplies. A summary of 21 studies on feedback between 1975 and 2000 indicates, in 
complete agreement with the earlier ABA research, that direct feedback constitutes 
the most effective means for generating savings in domestic electricity consumption. 
The greatest savings (c. 20%) were attained through providing consuming households 
with a table top interactive cost- and power-display unit, a smartcard reader for 
prepayment of electricity and an indicator showing cumulative cost of operating an 
electric cooker. Indirect feedback in the form of enhanced billing also influenced 
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savings. Twenty-one studies between 1975 and 2000 show that these direct 
interventions were responsible for up to 20% savings. Indirect feedback includes such 
factors as more frequent bills based on meter readings and historical feedback on 
consumption and costs of electricity (European Environment Agency, 2013). These 
interventions are generally less effective than direct measures.  
 All of these measures involve the identification and management of 
contingencies that influence the behavior of individual customers or households. The 
behavior of these individuals/units is then influenced by skillful management of these 
contingencies to produce an overall level of macro-behavior that fulfills corporate 
projections. Such macro-behavior does not evolve; it adjusts to changing 
contingencies imposed from without. We would say in terms of the BPM that the 
consumer behavior setting is relatively closed, therefore. The consumers has little or 
no option but to conform to the contingencies imposed and, although he/she may do 
so “willingly”, i.e., he/she is responding to positive rather than negative 
reinforcement, the scope of the consumer behavior setting remains highly restricted. 
Central agencies such as the European Environmental Agency can monitor an 
encourage the progress of whole nations in adopting an appropriate strategy. But the 
pattern of engagement is always between a corporate metacontingency and the 
behavior and macro-behavior of numerous individuals or households. The aim of the 
managerial intervention is to manipulate the pattern of reinforcement consumer face 
and to effect closure of the scope of thee consumer behavior setting.    
Domestic Water Consumption   
The ABA-derived predictions in terms of the marketing firm are that the 
crucial marketing mix element is price (or perhaps value for money) while the pattern 
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of reinforcement that must be maintained or enhanced is low utilitarian reinforcement 
and low informational reinforcement: maintenance.   
 The actual marketing response has been the installation of metering to provide 
instant/almost instant feedback on consumption and costs, and its judicious use 
provides close links between consumption and the benefits obtained. This enables 
cost incurred by obtaining utilitarian benefits to be minimized; encourages use of less 
water. Water conservation measures also rely heavily on metering so many of these 
considerations apply there too. The criteria for achieving sustainability in this area 
have been set out for the UK by Hetherington (2007) who, in a report to the WWF, 
encapsulates them in several “rules” of which the most indicative of the approach 
taken are that as a generalization the entire cost incurred by a water utility should be  
charged to consumers; water should be metered so that household tariffs avoid fixed 
annual charges (which are inefficient and encourage waste); and, ideally, the 
benchmark price of metered water prices should be the marginal cost of providing it 
(i.e., the extra cost of one more unit).    
 All of these rules respond to water consumers or households as individuals. 
Again, the macro-behavior of these units is the input to the corporate planning and 
operations of the utility companies, which are metacontingencies. The import of 
treating households as if they were units of consumption is that they are not expected 
to produce outputs other than the collective behavior of the individuals who compose 
them. The marketing mix is aimed at the management of the contingencies 
responsible for the pattern of individual behavior; this management is achieved by the 
provision to consumers of a pattern of reinforcement that will have the desired 
behavioral effects; the consumer’s/household’s behavior setting scope is reduced by 
the provision of single pattern of behavior which will be overwhelmingly preferred. I 
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am not making any judgment about the benignity of these measures, or the conduct of 
the utility companies, or the economic system in which they operate. My interest is 
solely academic: the relevance of metacontingencies and bilateral contingencies to 
our understanding consumer and marketer behaviors.  
Principles of Contingency Management 
It is apparent from this that several principles of corporate response are 
consonant with the prescriptions of metacontingency theory. First, it is necessary to 
maintain a similar pattern of contingencies to that currently maintaining less prosocial 
behavior, though consideration should be given to the levels of utilitarian 
reinforcement and informational reinforcement being enhanced. This is in line with 
Biglan and Glenn’s (2013) principle that prosocial behavior should be richly 
reinforced. Second, the consumer behavior setting scope needs to be modified. One 
may see this as a closure of the setting in that at present the consumer has the choice 
between a problem behavior and the prosocial pattern we wish to engender, whereas 
we are seeking to restrict his/her choice to the latter. This view would be in line with 
Biglan and Glenn’s (2013) principle of setting limits for problem behavior. Or it 
could be seen as enhancing the degree of choice available to the consumer by offering 
a new behavior pattern and thereby increasing the number of options available to the 
consumer. This is in line with Biglan and Glenn’s (2013) principle that prosocial 
behavior is encouraged by reducing or removing toxic conditions. Insofar as the 
remoter, more long-run consequences of environment-impacting consumption are 
toxic, we are ultimately providing a more open setting for consumer behavior. 
Symmetry and Asymmetry between Contextual Systems 
The examination of how marketing firms have actually approached 
environmental problems permits further investigation of the relevant of 
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metacontingency and bilateral contingency to the analysis of firm—consumerate 
interactions. These relationships can be understood in terms of their being 
symmetrical or asymmetrical.  
Symmetry  
By symmetry is meant the interaction of two organizations each marked by 
metacontingency such that their behavior can be analyzed in terms of an overaching 
metacontingent system. The advantage of symmetry is that there is a degree of 
equality between the parties to a transaction. If both parties to the transaction are 
metacontingencies, each has an output/product that enables the other to tailor its 
marketing mixes appropriately. For example, in the case of a marketing firm 
interacting with a corporate customer, each can read the other’s behavior in terms of a 
unified marketing mix or purchasing policy from which it can infer the strategy of the 
other and respond to it strategically. This leads to more appropriate marketing mixes 
and acquisition strategies, greater efficiency and long term relationships that enhance 
product development Each organization has control of its behavior setting to a 
considerable (though, of course, not absolute) degree. Each organization matters to 
the other sufficiently for its strategic ends to be taken into consideration in large 
degree by the other. Each party has the opportunity to assert its strategic aims and if it 
chooses not to transact with the other, this will have tangible effects on the other’s 
fortunes. The result is a long-term relationship between the transacting organizations, 
so-called relationship marketing.   
Asymmetry 
Asymmetry, however, is marked by inequality of interaction in the following 
sense. If only one party to the transaction is a metacontingency, i.e., the marketing 
firm, it might be said that each member of the consumerate is pitched against the 
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marketing output of an organization that has the resources to plan a marketing mix 
that is to some degree imposed on the consumerate. In all of the cases we have 
considered, the relationships are asymmetrical – there is considerable inequality of 
status between the marketing firm and individual consumer or household. The 
consumerate is not in a position to develop a strategic stance let alone to act as a 
metacontingency that has strategic outputs. (A household might be considered a small 
metacontingency but it is not able to exert market power vis-à-vis the marketing 
firm.) There is no need in principle for the marketing firm to seek long-term 
relationships with its individual consumers in this case. As long as the marketing firm 
achieves its revenue, profit or other goals, it is immaterial whether it seeks to meet the 
requirements of each available market segment let alone each consumer. However, the 
exercise of environmental conservation by marketing firms has in practice been 
effective and many of the provisions (such as metering) have been welcomed by 
customers.  
 The explanation suggested here derives from the existence of bilateral 
contingencies which in a market economy ensure that consumers’ setting scope is 
sufficiently open to allow them to transfer their business to another supplier. The 
nature of the bilateral contingencies that bind firms and their consumers also offers 
explanation of the different kinds of relationships we have identified (Figure 5). 
Bilateral contingencies differ in the extent to which they are firm or fragile, that is the 
extent to which they promote orderly exchange between customers and suppliers. 
Figure 5 places the four areas of consumption, ordinally, on a continuum from firm to 
fragile bilateral contingencies. Energy consumption is marked by a moderately firm 
bilateral contingency. Consumption occurs in a situation in which consumers have a 
choice of supplier since there is competition among providers. But they also have the 
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option of overconsuming if they prefer as long as they can pay for the energy they 
use. Metering does control consumption very effectively, however. Water 
consumption is marked by an even more firm bilateral contingency: there may not be 
competition for particular consumers among suppliers even though providers may be 
regulated by national bodies to provide an acceptable level of service. Despite some 
similarities in consumption and marketing between energy and water, water belongs 
closer to the firm pole of the continuum because of the low elasticity of demand that 
characterizes this commodity and the lack of competition among suppliers. Neither of 
these is true of energy consumption and provision. Transportation occurs in an even 
more open setting because of the high levels of competition among providers and the 
alternative of private motoring if the high levels of utilitarian and informational 
reinforcement that consumers demand are not otherwise met. Finally, most open of all 
is the setting in which littering is a possibility. There is no long-term relationship 
between marketers and their consumerate; indeed, we are dealing with a fleeting 
relationship which does not entail marketing in any generally-understood sense. There 
is no possibility of policing green areas such that littering will be eliminated. The 
contingencies are distant, you have to get caught, the fines seem remote and unlikely, 
and although everyone says they prefer a clean environment the fact that littering 
increases where there is already little undermines this. There is no immediacy of 
mutual reinforcement.       
 How do the bilateral contingencies vary among these marketing and 
consumption patterns? Those at the firm end of the continuum are close or proximal 
(dovetailing the behaviors of marketers and consumers. They involve easily read 
stimulus profiles (the elements of supplier behavior that act as motivating operations 
or discriminative stimuli for customer behavior are very apparent and vice versa), 
 29 
they are immediately acting (especially in the case of metered commodities), and they 
are reliable. At the fragile end, however, contingencies are remote or distal, not easily 
read, delayed, and unreliable (the chances are I will not be caught for littering).  
Moreover, the relationships between water and energy utilities and transport 
organizations entail genuine marketing relationships: the exchanges are literal and 
embrace the whole of the marketing mix; those involved in the reduction of littering 
rely principally on persuasion, there is no literal exchange, though metaphorical 
analogs may be suggested. These fragile bilateral contingencies signal a sphere of 
behavior change that does not invoke marketing at the intermediate levels considered 
in this paper so much as real social marketing and cultural contingencies.   
Conclusions 
Environmental concern often stems from problems of consumption. If 
behavior analysis is to contribute to the solution of these problems, we need to 
understand what environment-impacting consumption is contingent upon, how 
response to environment-impacting consumption works, and how environment-
impacting consumption and that response are related. Consumer behavior is 
contingent on pattern of reinforcement and consumer behavior setting scope; 
environment-impacting consumption is similarly contingent. Response to 
environment-impacting consumption is undertaken by the marketing firm which seeks 
to influence consumer choice via the modification of patterns of reinforcement and 
setting scope. Firms also manage bilateral contingencies which link them via 
networks of close contingency with their consumerates. Whereas marketing firms are 
metacontingencies, consumerates are composed of a mass of individual consumers 
whose combined activity is better characterized as macro-behavior. The relationships 
between marketing firms and consumerates are asymmetrical, but the skillful 
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management of bilateral contingencies can ensure that consumers remain involved in 
the process of alleviating environmental concern.      
Metacontingency and Bilateral contingency  
Each of the marketing programs we have examined involves an organization 
(a single contextual system) interacting with its customer base (a large number of 
contextual systems). The marketing firm generates a marketing mix, not for each of 
the consumers it seeks to respond to/influence, but for each segment of the market 
that is measurable, accessible, justifiable, differentiable, actionable (Kotler, Keller, 
Brady, Goodman & Hansen, 2012). This does not mean that it envisions each segment 
of its customer base as a metacontingency; rather a segment is characterized precisely 
by what Biglan &Glenn (2013) call macro-behavior: to the firm it is an aggregate of 
consumers who will act similarly in the face of the marketing mix the firm designs 
and implements for it. Each member of a segment responds to the marketing mix in a 
predicted way and as the contingencies contained in the mix vary the individual 
consumer’s behavior will vary. But there is no overall output of the consumer base’s 
behavior that is other than an aggregate of the behavior of each of its members. It is 
the marketing mix that produces sales, not any one element of it but the emergent 
bundle. It is unlikely that marketing firms know what their consumers are buying and 
while this may not matter if the market for widgets is large enough in the short to 
medium term it will affect the marketing firm’s fortunes in the long term if 
technological advance overtakes its product offering. This amorphous nature of the 
marketing mix, the inability of the marketing firm to pin down precisely what 
generates its sales, is especially important for business-to-business marketing.       
 How would this be different if the marketing firm were transacting with a 
corporate customer? The customer in this case would itself be a metacontingency, a 
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complex of interlocking internal behavioral contingencies out of which would emerge 
a purchasing strategy that specified the kinds of products/services it required, its 
conception of value (i.e., what it would be willing to pay); this strategy would be 
revealed in negotiations with the marketing firm and would be an output of the 
behavior not of any individual or group but of the overall organization. This strategy 
would be a behavior pattern of the organization which would have consequences of its 
own in the market place in terms of the effectiveness with which it contributed to the 
overall strategic goals of the customer organization in which it originated. The 
relationships between the marketing firm and its customer would then be an 
interaction of metacontingencies. The amorphousness of the marketing firm’s 
marketing mix is compounded by the amorphousness of the customer firm’s 
purchasing strategy.   
 The marketing mix that is the supra-personal behavioral output of the 
marketing firm is met, in the market place, by the purchasing strategy of the firm 
which is its customer. In this case, while the marketing firm may produce a mix for 
each segment it serves, it is likely to tailor the mix for each customer firm each of 
which has it own requirements that are profitable for the marketing firm to meet 
separately. At the theoretical level, however, the interesting outcome is that the 
marketing firm is dealing with an emergent output from its customer that may be 
difficult to describe definitive. 
Practical Implications  
There will only be greater symmetry in the relationships between marketing 
firms and their ultimate consumerates if consumers join forces by forming an 
association that develops an output a policy or strategy to guide its members’ 
behaviors with respect to the marketer which is over and above the aggregate 
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behaviors of individual consumers. If this occurred, the consumerate would become a 
metacontingency and its relationship with marketing firms would be more equal. The 
strategic output of the consumer association would evolve the meet consumers’ 
changing requirements. 
 The attempt to use social marketing – defined as an attempt to alter cultural or 
macro-contingencies directly – brings new organizations into play, the interests of 
which may not be those of the consumerate. This does not necessarily meet the need 
of the consumerate to develop countervailing power vis-à-vis marketing firms. There 
is no obvious bilateral contingency between the social marketer in this sense and the 
consumerate. There is clearly a need for behavior analytical research to address this 
practical issue. Fortunately, the concepts of metacontingency and bilateral 
contingency have proved consonant with one another, giving hope that further 
research will develop further their theoretical and practical implications. 
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Figure 1. Summative Behavioral Perspective Model  Source: Foxall (1990/2004).  Adapted by 
permission.  
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Figure 2. Patterns of Reinforcement and Operant Classes of Consumer Behaviour.  
Source: Foxall (1990/2004). Adapted by permission. 
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Figure 3. Environment-Impacting Consumption: Operant Classes and Dominant Marketing Mix 
Elements.  Source: Focall (2010).  Adapted by permission. 
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Figure 4. Bilateral Contingency.  Source: Foxall (1999a).  Adapted by permission. 
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Figure 5. Bilateral Contingency in the Context of Environmental Concern. 
